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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal and cross-appeal 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, and Rule 
3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. The trial court exercised permissible discretion in exercising its 
equitable powers in offsetting the present value of Carolyn's Social Security benefits 
against the value of other marital assets. 
Standard of Review. A trial court has considerable discretion 
concerning property division in a divorce proceeding, and its actions enjoy a 
presumption of validity which will not be disturbed unless clearly unjust or clearly an 
abuse of discretion. Elman v. Elman, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2002), Walters v. 
Walters. 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 1991). 
Issue Preserved. This point is in Mark's capacity as Appellee, and as 
such, Carolyn has preserved the issue. See, Brief of Appellant, Page 1, Statement 
of the Issues, No. 1. In addition, Mark filed a Trial Memorandum on the Social 
Security retirement issue, R. at p. 301-307. 
2. Did the trial court err, as a matter of law, in basing its alimony award, 
in significant part, by including within its determination of her monthly needs, the cost 
of maintaining health insurance coverage for the parties' two adult children? 
Standard of Review. A question of law is reviewed for correctness, 
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affording no deference to the trial court's ruling. Toone v. Toone. 952 P.2d 112 
(Utah App. 1998). 
Issue Preserved. Transcript, Volume I of III, Pages 216-221, R. at p. 
498; Transcript, Volume III of III, Page 731, R. at p. 500 (Mark's counsel's closing 
argument). 
3. Did the trial court exceed the scope of its permissible discretion, in 
denying Mark's Motion for New Trial on the alimony issue, because of newly 
discovered evidence? 
Standard of Review. The denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed 
upon an "abuse of discretion" standard. State of Utah, in the Interest of J.P.. 921 
P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1996). 
Issue Preserved. Notice of Appeal. R. pp. 489-490 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves cross-appeals in a divorce action. Carolyn Olsen filed for 
divorce against Mark Olsen on December 11, 2003. A bench trial was held before 
the Honorable Scott M. Hadley, District Judge, on March 14 and 18, and April 4, 
2005. 
Judge Hadley ruled, based upon expert testimony, that the present value of 
Carolyn's Social Security retirement benefits was $115,434. The expert also 
testified that the present value of Carolyn's Utah State Retirement teacher's pension 
was $479,121.77, and that the present value of Mark's civil service retirement 
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pension was $897,804.70. 
Judge Hadley also ruled that Carolyn should be awarded $862 per month 
alimony, based in significant part by including within Carolyn's reasonable monthly 
needs budget, a $556.59 per month health insurance premium that covered Carolyn 
and the parties' two adult, emancipated sons. 
A Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered on January 9, 2006. On 
January 18, 2006, Mark filed a Motion for New Trial on the alimony issue. Judge 
Hadley entered an Order Denying Respondent's Motion for New Trial on June 20, 
2006. 
Carolyn filed her Notice of Appeal on July 19,2006, and Mark filed his Notice 
of Appeal as cross-appellant on August 2, 2006. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Mark and Carolyn Olsen were married on May 5,1978 in Eden, Weber 
County, Utah. R. p. 1. 
2. During the entirety of the parties' marriage, Carolyn was employed as 
a school teacher for the Weber County School District, R. p. 2, and Mark was a 
federal civil service employee at Hill Air Force Base, R. p. 2. 
3. During their marriage, Carolyn acquired both a defined benefit and 
defined contribution retirement plan with the Utah State Retirement System. 
R. p. 3 
4. Similarly, during their marriage, Mark acquired both a defined benefit 
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and defined contribution plan through the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS). 
R. p. 3 
5. Carolyn also participates in the federal Social Security System, 
contributing $216.03 per month from her paycheck. Tr. pp. 40-41; R. p. 498. 
6. Mark does not participate in the Social Security System, because he is 
in the federal Civil Service Retirement System. Tr. pp. 394-395; 397; R. p. 499; Trial 
Exhibits R-5 (Mark's CSRS Benefit Estimate Report) and R-6 (Mark's Civilian Leave 
and Earnings Statement), and any eligibility for Social Security by Mark would have 
resulted in a commensurate decrease in his CSRS pension annuity, pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 8349 (Addendum A, this Brief). 
7. Mark contributes approximately $610 per month out of his paycheck into 
the CSRS defined benefit retirement plan. Tr. p. 557, II. 3-15; R. p. 500; Trial Exhibit 
R-6. 
8. Brent Griffiths, CPA, testified as an expert witness in accounting and 
present value calculation of future streams of income. Tr. p. 321, R. p. 499. 
9. Mr. Griffiths testified as to the present value of both parties' defined 
benefit retirement plans and Carolyn's Social Security benefits. Tr. pp. 322-325, R. 
p. 499. He testified that future Social Security benefits, as well as future Utah State 
Teacher's Retirement monthly payments and future Federal Civil Service Retirement 
monthly payments, are all annuities within the meaning of Revenue Ruling 205-13. 
Tr. pp. 325-326, R. p. 499. 
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10. Through Mr. Griffiths' testimony, a two page exhibit, Trial Exhibit R-22, 
was introduced. Exhibit R-22 calculated the present value of Mark's CSRS pension 
as $897,804.70; of Carolyn's Utah State Retirement System teacher's pension as 
$479,121.77; and of Carolyn's Social Security benefits to be $115,435.24 (Page 2 
of Trial Exhibit R-22) (Addendum A, this Brief). The Social Security benefit present 
value was arrived at ultimately after Judge Hadley asked Mr. Griffiths to make certain 
adjustments. Tr. pp. 335-342, R. p. 499. 
11. Mr. Griffiths also testified that $53,196 had come out of Carolyn's 
paychecks and paid into the Social Security System. Tr. p. 324, R. p. 499; Carolyn's 
Trial Exhibit P-1. 
12. The parties also each had a defined contribution retirement plan. 
Carolyn's was a 401 (k) plan with a value of $119,519.53 as of December 31, 2003 
when Mark stopped contributing to his defined contribution plan designated as a 
Thrift Savings Plan. Finding of Fact No. 74, R. p. 377 (Addendum C, this Brief). The 
trial court valued Mark's TSP at $93,639 as of December 31, 2003. Finding of Fact 
No. 75, R. p. 377. 
13. Judge Hadley's Findings of Fact on the parties' retirement accounts are 
found in Findings of Fact Nos. 68-76, R. pp. 376-377, and can be summarized as 
follows: That the parties had essentially five retirement plans; that during the 
marriage Carolyn contributed to Social Security and Mark did not; that federal law 
prohibited the direct division of Carolyn's Social Security benefits; that the best way 
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to divide Mark's CSRS pension and Carolyn's Utah State Retirement teacher's 
pension was by the Woodward formula, with each party receiving one-half of the 
benefits acquired during their marriage. 
14. The trial court concluded that Carolyn's Social Security benefits were 
valued at $115,435.24, Finding of Fact No. 72, R. p. 376, and concluded that, since 
there is no established controlling law, they were a marital asset. Conclusion of Law 
No. 14, R. p. 391. 
15. Both parties briefed the Social Security issue for the trial court. R. pp. 
258-284 (Carolyn's Trial Memorandum and supporting cases); R. pp. 301-307 
(Mark's Trial Memorandum) 
16. The trial court ordered Carolyn to pay Mark $9,421.50 to equalize part 
of the parties' marital assets, which included valuing Carolyn's Social Security, but 
did not include either Carolyn's or Mark's defined benefit pensions. Conclusions of 
Law Nos. 20-22, R. pp. 392-393. This equalization of part of the parties' assets also 
did not include the almost $275,000 in house equity which was divided equaiiy. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 29 and 31, R. pp. 370-371, Conclusions of Law Nos. 6, R. p. 
389 and 8-10, R. p. 390. 
17. At the parties' temporary order hearing on February 5,2004, Mark was 
ordered to pay Carolyn $465 per month temporary alimony. Finding of Fact No. 8, 
R. p. 367. 
18. The temporary alimony award was premised, in part, on Carolyn's 
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providing family insurance coverage including covering the parties' then minor child 
Jesse, born November 27, 1986. R. p. 1 (Jessie's birth date) 
19. At trial, Carolyn testified, on cross-examination, that her health 
insurance premium had gone from $308.80 per month (for family coverage) to 
$556.59 per month, and that covered herself and the parties' by then two 
emancipated adult sons, Jesse having turned 18 on November 27, 2004, 
approximately four months prior to the trial. Tr. pp. 217-219, R. p. 498. Carolyn did 
not know how much the premium would be just to cover herself. Tr. p. 219, R. p. 
498. Her alimony request was premised on the health insurance premium figure of 
$556.59 per month, as part of her reasonable needs. Tr. pp. 220-221, R. p. 498 
20. The trial court found that Carolyn's $556.59 per month out-of-pocket 
health insurance premium was reasonable, and was part of the standard of living of 
the parties. Findings of Fact Nos. 105-109, R. pp. 382-383. The trial court found 
that this $556.59 per month figure was, dollar-for-dollar, part of Carolyn's monthly 
living expenses necessary to maintain her standard of living to which she had grown 
accustomed, Finding of Fact No. 118, R. p. 385, and that her monthly shortfall was 
$862, Finding of Fact No. 123, R. pp. 385-386. This led directly to the court's 
alimony award of $862 per month. Conclusion of Law No. 27, R. p. 394. 
21. At trial, respondent's counsel questioned Carolyn concerning the 
appropriateness of considering expenses for other adults as part of her personal 
needs. Tr. pp. 220-21, R. p. 498, and argued, in closing argument, that it was 
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inappropriate to do so. Tr. p. 731, R. p. 500. 
22. The Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered January 9, 2006. 
R. p. 358 
23. On January 18,2006, Mark filed a Motion for New Trial and To Alter or 
Amend That Part of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce Which Awards Petitioner 
$862 Per Month Alimony, pursuant to Rule 7 and 59(a)(4) and (e), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, seeking a reduction of alimony from $862 per month to $362 per 
month. R. p. 398. 
24. In his Supporting Affidavit, R. pp. 400-404 (plus attached exhibits), Mark 
alleged that historically Carolyn had, in consultation with Mark, provided family health 
insurance coverage because the Weber County School Board paid for it; that at the 
time of the temporary order hearing during the pendency of the divorce, she was not 
out-of-pocket for this coverage; that during the pendency of the proceedings, and 
unilaterally and without consulting Mark, Carolyn opted for a policy during the 2004-
2005 school year oniy, which cosi her $556.59 per month, the increased cost of 
which she did not even attempt to have him share, because he could have provided 
coverage through his employment much less expensively; and that, as of October 
1,2005, after the trial but more than three months before entry of the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce, Carolyn's out-of-pocket health insurance had gone from $556.59 
per month to $74.66 per month. Mark's Supplement to His Motion for New Trial, 
etc., and attached Exhibit A, R. p. 409. The parties briefed this issue. R. pp. 405-
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408 (Mark's Memorandum); R. pp. 413-414 (Carolyn's Objection to Mark's Motion), 
R. pp. 431-436 (Carolyn's Memorandum); R. pp. 437-439 (Carolyn's Affidavit); R. pp. 
452-456 (Mark's Reply Memorandum). 
25. Judge Hadley issued an Order Denying Respondent's Motion for New 
Trial, entered June 21,2006, ruling that InreJ.P.. 921 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1996), 
contained special circumstances for Rule 59 motions that did not apply to Mark's 
motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Social Security Issue. Utah's trial courts have considerable 
discretion concerning property division in divorce proceedings, and may consider all 
relevant circumstances. Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). Considering the 
present value of Carolyn's Social Security benefits under the rather unique 
circumstances of this case, is within the proper exercise of this discretion. Those 
circumstances include the facts that both Carolyn and Mark contributed out of their 
paychecks into federal statutory retirement systems - Carolyn into Social Security 
and Mark into CSRS. Carolyn receives a full Woodward v. Woodward. 656 P.2d 431 
(Utah 1982) (hereinafter Woodward) share of Mark's CSRS. The $53,196 coming 
out of Carolyn's paycheck into Social Security could have been invested in a private 
retirement plan, and there would be no argument that it was divisible by the trial 
court. 
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Contrary to Carolyn's argument, Congress has not preempted state courts 
from considering Social Security benefits in dividing marital assets. Rather, 42 
U.S.C. Section 407(a) prohibits only the direct division of Social Security benefits, 
and does not prohibit a court from considering them in fashioning an equitable 
distribution of marital property. 
Nothing in Judge Hadley's order even remotely affects Carolyn's future 
receipt of Social Security benefits. If she lives to the appropriate age, she receives 
them in full. Carolyn's claim that her future receipt of these benefits is too 
speculative and contingent is not a compelling argument. Personal injury cases 
routinely involve the present valuing of future income streams dependent upon the 
same actuarial assumptions. 
Appellate courts from Ohio, Massachusetts, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, 
Maine; Arizona, and Pennsylvania have all held that trial courts may, in various 
ways, take into account Social Security benefits in equitably apportioning marital 
property, but may not directly divide them. See, e.g., Neviiie v. Neviiie, 99 Ohio 
St.3d 275,791 N.E.2d 434 (2003) (approving awarding to appellant of marital house 
equity as explicitly balancing value of appellee's Social Security benefits). 
Carolyn's citation to the language of footnote 2 in Jeffries v. Jeffries. 895 
P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995), which footnote 2 cites Flemminq v. Nestor. 363 U.S. 603 
(1960) is not compelling. The Jeffries court did not actually reach the issue of 
whether Social Security benefits are marital property and thus footnote 2 is non-
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binding dicta. In addition, Flemming v. Nestor held only that that portion of the 
Social Security Act which divested a deported alien of Social Security benefits did 
not deprive him of a vested property right. This is different than saying a court may 
not even consider Carolyn's benefits in the overall equitable distribution. It may be 
that Judge Hadley used the wrong terminology in holding that they were marital 
property, but he could consider their value in his overall distribution. 
2. The Alimony Issue. Carolyn's standard of living, during the parties' 
marriage, never included providing health insurance coverage for adult children. 
Sections 78-45-3 and 4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, impose on parents a 
legal obligation to support their children, defined in Section 78-45-2(6) as minors. 
Providing health insurance and medical care is part of supporting a minor child, just 
as is clothing and educating a child. There is no legal obligation to provide support 
of any kind for an emancipated child. If there were, courts would be able to order 
divorcing parents to pay for college and post-graduate education. Thus, the trial 
court, as a matter of law, erred in ruling that Carolyn's standard of living included 
providing health insurance coverage for adult children. 
Carolyn historically paid very little out-of-pocket for the family health 
insurance. When she unilaterally changed the coverage during the pendency of the 
proceedings, resulting in a much higher premium, Mark was unaware. Then, three 
months before the Decree was even entered, but after the trial court ruled that the 
$556.59 per month family premium was part of Carolyn's personal standard of living, 
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Carolyn reduced the premium to approximately $75 per month. Divorces are 
equitable proceedings, and to compel Mark to file a petition to modify alimony when 
the changed circumstances occurred months before the Decree was signed, 
frustrates judicial economy. In addition, the trial court should have found that this 
case presented special circumstances analogous to those of In re J.P.. 921 P.2d 
1012 (Utah App. 1996). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
EXERCISING ITS EQUITABLE DISCRETION BY 
OFFSETTING THE VALUE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
BENEFITS AGAINST OTHER MARITAL ASSETS, AS NO 
HARM WAS DONE TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
SYSTEM AND AN EQUITABLE RESULT WAS 
ACHIEVED. 
Utah's trial courts have considerable discretion concerning property division 
in divorce proceedings, and may consider all relevant circumstances. Burke v. 
Burke. 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987). Where the circumstances are unique, the trial 
court may reaiiocate separate property to achieve an equitabie resuit. Elman v. 
Elman, 45 P.3d 176 (Utah App. 2003); Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64 (Utah App. 
1991). Considering the present value of Carolyn's Social Security benefits 
constitutes just such unique circumstances under the facts of this case. 
Carolyn's citation to Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo. 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 
L.Ed.2d 1 (1979), involving railroad retirement benefits, and McCarty v. McCartv. 453 
U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), involving military retirement 
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benefits is inapposite. In both Hisquierdo and McCarty. divorce trial courts tried to 
divide directly federal benefits that were statutorily exempted from such a division. 
In the present case, Judge Hadley attempted no such division, which Mark 
acknowledges would be an improper interference with the Social Security system. 
Rather, Judge Hadley recognized the inherent inequity in allowing Carolyn a full 
Woodward portion of all of Mark's retirements, but excluding Mark from any 
consideration regarding Carolyn's - despite the fact that $53,196 had come out of 
Carolyn's marital earnings, and that Carolyn will receive her full Social Security 
benefit at retirement. 
It is submitted that the Social Security Act's 42 U.S.C. Section 407(a) 
provision (see Addendum in Brief of Appellant) has not preempted state divorce 
courts from an equitable consideration of the value of Social Security benefits in 
dividing marital assets, but, rather, prohibits only their direct division. Appellate 
courts from Ohio, Massachusetts, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Arizona, and Pennsylvania 
have a!! so held. 
In Neville v. Neville. 99 Ohio St.3d 275, 791 N.E.2d 434 (2003), the trial court 
adopted the magistrate's recommendations that the present value of each spouse's 
Social Security benefits could be considered when dividing marital property. 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the trial court. The Neville court first 
discussed 42 U.S.C. Section 407(a)'s provision that prohibits any transfer or 
assignment of Social Security benefits, and, "...in general protects these benefits 
13 
from 'execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process"'. Neville. 791 
N.E.2d 434, at 436. The court then discussed Hisquierdo. McCarty. and Mansell v. 
Mansell. 490 U.S. 581 109 S.Ct. 2023, 104 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989) (involving military 
disability benefits), and stated: 
In Hoyt v. Hoyt [citation omitted], we therefore held 
that Social Security benefits themselves are not subject to 
division in a divorce proceeding. The question remains 
whether a trial court may consider Social Security benefits 
at all when dividing property in a divorce proceeding. The 
courts that have addressed this issue have taken 
divergent positions. 791 N.E.2d 434 at 436. 
The Neville court then sets forth the various positions, including that a court 
cannot even consider the value of Social Security benefits; that they may be 
considered only when compared to other retirement benefits, or, more specifically, 
other defined benefit retirement benefits; or that a trial court may consider the value 
of such benefits as one factor in the overall scheme when making a property 
division. The Ohio Supreme Court then held: 
We believe that allowing consideration of Social 
Security benefits in relation to all marital assets is the 
more reasoned approach...Although a party's Social 
Security benefits cannot be divided as a marital asset, 
those benefits may be considered by the trial court under 
the catchall category as a relevant and equitable factor in 
making an equitable distribution. Accordingly, we hold 
that a trial court, in seeking to make an equitable 
distribution of marital property, may consider the parties' 
future Social Security benefits in relation to all marital 
assets. 791 P.2d 434 at 437. 
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The following courts of other jurisdictions have taken the value of Social 
Security benefits into account in dividing marital assets: Mahonev v. Mahoney. 425 
Mass. 441, 681 N.E.2d 852 (1997) (considering Social Security benefits along with 
other factors in determining equitable division of marital assets); In re Marriage of 
Knipp. 15 Kan. App.2d 494, 800 P.2d 562 (1991) (Social Security benefits not 
subject to division directly, but anti-assignment clause in Social Security Act does 
not prohibit a court from considering the value of those benefits in the division of 
remaining marital property); see also for Kansas, In re Marriage of Brane. 21 Kan. 
App.2d 778, 908 P.2d 625 (1995) (wife awarded larger portion of pension in order 
to equalize disparity in Social Security benefits); Bover v. Boyer. 538 N.W.2d 293 
(Iowa 1995) (balancing specific present values of Social Security benefits in making 
an overall property division); Rudden v. Rudden. 765 S.W.2d 719 (Mo. App. 1989) 
(considering value of Social Security benefits as one of many economic factors in 
property and alimony awards); Pongonis v. Pongonis. 606 A.2d 1055 (Maine 1992) 
(as state employee, husband did not contribute to Social Security System; disparity 
of Social Security benefits could be considered, so that where the combination of the 
value of wife's Social Security and Kennebec Valley Medical Center retirement plan 
approximated the value of husband's state retirement, proper for court to award each 
party that party's respective retirement benefits [which was basically a dollar-for-
dollar offset]); Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 397 Pa.Super. 421, 580 A.2d 369 (1990) (to 
facilitate the process of equating CSRS participants and Social Security participants, 
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court approved the present value of a Social Security benefit, as if the CSRS 
participant had been participating in the Social Security System, and then deducting 
it from the present value of the CSRS pension). 
In KeJly v. Kelly. 198 Ariz. 307, 9 P.3d 1046 (2000), husband's entire CSRS 
pension was treated as a marital asset by the trial court, while only wife's non-Social 
Security was so treated. The Arizona Supreme Court adopted the same approach 
as the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Kelly v. Kelly, supra, and observed: 
Viewed another way, it can be seen that in the 
absence of social security contributions, the [marital] 
community could have spent, saved, or invested those 
funds as it saw fit. In each instance the resulting asset, if 
any, would have been divisible as community property. 
But, as matters presently stand, community funds have 
been diverted to the separate benefit of one spouse. We 
believe this situation compels an equitable response. 
9P.3d1046at1048. 
Carolyn's citation to Jeffries v. Jeffries. 895 P.2d 835 (Utah App. 1995), and 
its footnote 2 reference to Flemminq v. Nestor. 363 U.S. 603 (1960) is not 
persuasive. Jeffries involved a 401(a) plan, and this court acknowledged that 
because "...the consideration of expected Social Security benefits as marital assets 
is not directly at issue in this case, it is unnecessary for us to reach this question." 
895 P.2d 836 at 838, fn. 2. (citing to language in Flemminq v. Nestor). 
But Fleming v. Nestor involved a different issue, to-wit: it held only that that 
portion of the Social Security Act which divested a deported alien of Social Security 
benefits did not deprive him of a vested, due process property right. 363 U.S. 603, 
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at 610-611. In so holding, all the United States Supreme Court did was uphold a 
section of the Social Security Act which said in effect, if you work here as a resident 
alien, and then are deported, you forfeit the funds you paid into Social Security. The 
Flemminq court did not deal with any issue of equitable offset of simply the value of 
Social Security funds a recipient will get. It is submitted that this court's language 
in footnote 2 of Jeffries is dicta, because this court was not called upon to actually 
rule on that issue. 
Counsel could find only one Utah case that came at all close to the present 
issue. In Brooks v. Brooks, 881 P.2d 955 (Utah App. 1994), a child support and 
visitation expense modification case, one of the issues was whether Section 78-45-
7.5(8)(b), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, conflicted with 42 U.S.C. Section 
407(a), quoted above (the anti-alienation clause of the Social Security Act). Section 
78-45-7.5(8)(b) provides: 
Social security benefits received by a child due to 
the earnings of a parent may be credited as child support 
to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by 
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of that 
parent. 
In Brooks, the mother argued that 42 U.S.C. Section 407(a) prohibits any sort 
of credit towards the father's child support obligations. Rejecting this position, this 
court held: 
...That is too broad a reading of section 407 and is wholly 
inconsistent with Utah law [citation to statute 
omitted]...Rather, the correct reading of section 407 is that 
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it prevents the trial court from ordering that the benefits 
received on Michelle's behalf be spent for some particular 
purpose. In other words, the court may not subject those 
benefits to any "legal process" (citations omitted). 881 
P.2d 955 at 961 (italics original) 
While not involving exactly the same issue, as in the present case, the Brooks case 
does allow an offset/credit for Social Security benefits against Mr. Brooks' 
independent child support obligation. It should also be noted that Mr. Brooks' 
income was a pension of $2,336.97 per month, plus $697 per month Social Security 
disability benefits. The offset/credit he received against his child support obligation 
was for a separate auxiliary Social Security benefit paid to his child. 
Finally, as to Carolyn's argument that Social Security benefits are not really 
"property" at all, whether marital or nonmarital, because Congress can, at least in 
theory, abolish the Social Security System, Mark has two responses. First, it strains 
credulity to think that Congress would actually abolish Social Security. Second, in 
the extremely unlikely circumstance that Congress did so, Carolyn could ask the trial 
court to modify its decision, pursuant to Section 30-3-5(3), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. Far and away, the most likely scenario is that Carolyn will live to Social 
Security retirement age and collect those benefits. 
Thus, Utah courts have broad equitable jurisdiction to consider the present 
value of Social Security benefits in dividing property incident to a decree of divorce. 
Numerous other states have so held, and no holding in existing Utah case law 
prohibits this. It is also submitted that, under the unique facts of this case, where 
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Mark does not participate in Social Security, it was a permissible equitable result. 
POINT II. AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED WHEN IT INCLUDED THE COST OF 
MAINTAINING HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
THE PARTIES' TWO ADULT CHILDREN WITHIN 
CAROLYN'S ESTABLISHED STANDARD OF LIVING 
FOR HERSELF. 
Section 30-3-5(8)(a)(i), Utah Code Annotated, as amended, mandates a 
divorce court to consider "the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse" 
(emphasis added) in determining alimony, and Section 30-3-5(8)(c) directs the court 
to look to the standard of living of the parties. Carolyn's standard of living, never 
really included providing health insurance coverage for adult children. Sections 78-
45-3 and 4, Utah Code Annotated, as amended, impose upon parents a legal 
obligation to support their children, defined in Section 78-45-2(6) as minors under 
the age of 18. Providing health insurance and medical care for minor children is part 
of supporting a minor child, just as is clothing, educating, music lessons, sports, 
shelter, etc. There is no legal obligation to provide support of any kind for an adult, 
emancipated child. If there were, courts would become involved in ordering 
divorcing parents to pay for college and post-graduate education, athletics and 
artistic endeavors, and other things of this nature. There is a legally imposed 
obligation to support minors. There is no such obligation to support adult children, 
and the trial court erred in considering Carolyn's $556.59 per month family premium 
which was higher by several hundred dollars than the premium for just insuring 
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herself, as part of the needs of the recipient spouse, Section 78-45-7.5(8)(a)(i). This 
part of the case should be reversed and remanded for entry of an alimony award that 
reflects consideration of the amount of Carolyn's health insurance premium alone. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED THE SCOPE 
OF ITS PERMISSIBLE DISCRETION IN DENYING 
MARK'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE 
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED, 
JUSTIFYING THE RELAXING OF THE NEWLY 
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT. 
Mark filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59(a)(4), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, which allows a trial court discretion to grant a new trial based upon 
"...[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which 
he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial." 
A trial court's ruling in this regard is upon an "abuse of discretion" standard. State 
of Utah in the Interest of J.P.. 921 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1996) 
The basic facts, as set forth in Mark's supporting Affidavit for the new trial 
motion (plus attached exhibits) were as follows: historically, Carolyn had, in 
consultation with Mark, provided the family coverage health insurance because the 
Weber County School Board paid for it; that at the time of the temporary order 
hearing on February 5, 2004 held early on during the pendency of the divorce, 
Carolyn was not out-of-pocket very much for this coverage; that during the 
subsequent pendency of the proceedings, unilaterally and without consulting Mark, 
Carolyn opted for a family policy during the 2004-2005 school year only (October, 
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2004 - September, 2005) which cost her $556.59 per month out-of-pocket, the 
increased cost of and about which she neither informed Mark nor attempted to have 
him share, because he could have provided coverage through his employment much 
less expensively; and that, as of October 1,2005, which was after the trial but more 
than three months before entry of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Carolyn's 
out-of-pocket health insurance premium cost had gone from $556.59 per month to 
$74.66 per month. See Mark's Supplement to His Motion for New Trial and attached 
Exhibit A. R. p. 409, showing that, on Carolyn's pay stub (Exhibit A to R. p. 409) she 
only contributes $74.66 per month, while the Weber County School District pays 
$671.94 per month. 
Mark relies on the case of State of Utah in Interest of J.P.. 921 P.2d 1012 
(Utah App. 1996). JJL was a termination of parental rights case, in which, at trial, 
numerous expert child psychologists, DCFS caseworkers, and others testified. Two 
of the children involved were in the same foster home, but the foster parents did not 
testify at trial and it was unclear whether they were interested in adopting the 
children. 921 P.2d 1012, at 1015. The juvenile court denied the termination petition 
eleven days after trial. That same day as the court entered its order, but before the 
parties were notified of its decision, the State learned that the two young children's 
foster parents were willing to adopt, and, accordingly, filed a Motion for a New Trial 
or To Alter or Amend the Judgment pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, based upon newly discovered evidence (the exact Motion Mark filed in 
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the present case). The juvenile court denied the State's motion, and the State 
appealed. 
Reversing the juvenile court, this court noted that in the unique setting of a 
termination of parental rights proceeding and to determine a child's best interest, the 
court needs continuing jurisdiction and must be free from Rule 59's strict 
requirements, especially since juvenile court proceedings are equitable in nature. 
921 P.2d 1012 at 1016. This court also concluded that the nature of juvenile court 
proceedings affected the relaxation of strict adherence to Rule 59 standards, 
because the State could simply refile the termination proceedings and allege the 
new facts, holding that "Allowing a liberal application of Rule 59 seems a more 
efficient remedy." 921 P.2d 1012, at 1018. 
While perhaps not quite as highly equitable as juvenile court proceedings, 
divorce cases are clearly equitable in nature. Iverson v. Iverson. 526 P.2d 1126 
(Utah 1974) and it is submitted that the present case also presents unique 
circumstances which allow for a more liberal interpretation of Ruie 59. 
Newly discovered evidence, to qualify as a basis for a new trial or to alter or 
amend the judgment, must be (1) material, competent evidence, which is in fact 
newly discovered, and (2) it must be such that it could not by due diligence, have 
been discovered and produced at trial. In re S.R.. 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 1987). This 
court, in J.P.. given its unique circumstances, relaxed the implicit Rule 59 
requirement that the newly discovered evidence must have been in existence at the 
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time of trial, in order to have been discoverable but not discovered by due diligence. 
An analogous situation exists in the present case. For all the years of the parties' 
marriage, Carolyn carried low cost health insurance coverage for the family. These 
were the circumstances at separation and, so far as Mark could tell, during the entire 
pendency of the proceedings, because he was unaware of the change in premium 
amount (see Statement of Facts No. 24, this Brief). 
Just as in J.P.. after trial, but months before the Judgment and Decree were 
entered, Carolyn reduced greatly the family insurance premium, from $556.59 per 
month to $74.66 per month. She had only had the excessively high premium for one 
school year, out of the parties' twenty-seven (27) years of marriage. To require Mark 
to file a petition to modify under these circumstances does not serve the interests of 
judicial economy, and amending the judgment by a reduction in Mark's alimony 
obligation commensurate with the difference in the two premiums, is the appropriate 
remedy on remand. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah trial courts have considerable discretion concerning property division in 
divorce proceedings, and may consider all relevant circumstances, including, where 
unique, separate and/or "nonmarital" property. Carolyn's Social Security benefits 
involve just such a unique circumstance, having come out of marital earnings. The 
better reasoned state decisions allow consideration of Social Security benefits in 
fashioning a property division in a divorce, and Utah law is consistent with Judge 
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Hadley's ruling, which should be affirmed. 
Health insurance premium costs incurred by Carolyn for the parties' adult 
children were included improperly by Judge Hadley in determining Carolyn's 
personal reasonable monthly needs for alimony purposes. In addition, under the 
special circumstances of this case, Carolyn reaped an alimony windfall by having, 
for only one year out of twenty-seven years of marriage, an insurance premium of 
$556.59 per month, which she had reduced to $74.66 per month more than three 
months before the Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered in this case. Judge 
Hadley should have granted Mark's Rule 59 motion and reduced the alimony award 
by the difference - $481.93. This court should remand for that purpose. 
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5 U.S.C.A. § 8349 
C 
Effective: [See Text Amendments] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 5. Government Organization and Employees (Refs & Annos) 
Part III. Employees (Refs & Annos) 
Subpart G. Insurance and Annuities (Refs & Annos) 
*i Chapter 83. Retirement (Refs & Annos) 
*n Subchapter HI. Civil Service Retirement (Refs & Annos) 
-•§ 8349. Offset relating to certain benefits under the Social Security Act 
(a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, if an individual under section 8402(b)(2) is entitled, 
or would on proper application be entitled, to old-age insurance benefits under title II of the Social Security Act, 
the annuity otherwise payable to such individual shall be reduced under this subsection. 
(2) A reduction under this subsection commences beginning with the first month for which the individual both-
(A) is entitled to an annuity under this subchapter; and 
(B) is entitled, or would on proper application be entitled, to old-age insurance benefits under title II of the 
Social Security Act. 
(3)(A)(i) Subject to clause (ii) and subparagraphs (B) and (C), the amount of a reduction under this subsection shall 
be equal to the difference between--
(I) the old-age insurance benefit which would be payable to the individual for the month referred to in paragraph 
(2); and 
(II) the old-age insurance benefit which would be so payable, excluding all wages derived from Federal service 
of the individual, and assuming the individual were fully insured (as defined by section 214(a) of the Social 
Security Act). 
(ii) For purposes of this subsection, the amount of a benefit referred to in subclause (I) or (II) of clause (i) shall be 
determined without regard to subsections (b) through (1) of section 203 of the Social Security Act, and without 
regard to the requirement that an application for such benefit be filed. 
(B) A reduction under this subsection— 
(i) may not exceed an amount equal to the product of« 
(I) the old-age insurance benefit to which the individual is entitled (or would on proper application be entitled) 
for the month referred to in paragraph (2), determined without regard to subsections (b) through (1) of section 
203 of the Social Security Act; and 
(II) a fraction, as determined under section 8421(b)(3) with respect to the individual, except that the reference 
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to "service" in subparagraph (A) of such section shall be considered to mean Federal service, and 
(ii) may not cause the annuity payment for an individual to be reduced below zero 
(C) An amount computed under subclause (I) or (II) of subparagraph (A)(i), or under subparagraph (B)(i)(I), for 
purposes of determining the amount of a reduction under this subsection shall be adjusted under section 8340 of 
this title 
(4) A reduction under this subsection applies with respect to the annuity otherwise payable to such individual under 
this subchapter (other than under section 8337) for the month mvolved-
(A) based on service of such individual, and 
(B) without regard to section 8345(j), if otherwise applicable 
(5) The operation of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection shall not be considered for purposes of applying 
the provisions of the second sentence of section 215(a)(7)(B)(i) or the provisions of section 215(d)(5)(ii) of the 
Social Security Act in determining any amount under subclause (I) or (II) of paragraph (3)(A)(i) or paragraph 
(3)(B)(i)(I) for purposes of this subsection 
(b)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter-
(A) a disability annuity to which an individual described in section 8402(b)(2) is entitled under this subchapter, 
and 
(B) a survivor annuity to which a person is entitled under this subchapter based on the service of an individual 
described in section 8402(b)(2), 
shall be subject to reduction under this subsection if that individual or person is also entitled (or would on proper 
application also be entitled) to any similar benefits under title II of the Social Security Act based on the wages and 
self-employment income of such individual described in section 8402(b)(2) 
(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), reductions under this subsection shall be made in a manner consistent with the 
manner in which reductions under subsection (a) are computed and otherwise made 
(B) Reductions under this subsection shall be discontinued if, or for so long as, entitlement to the similar benefits 
under title II of the Social Security Act (as referred to in paragraph (1)) is terminated (or, in the case of an 
individual who has not made proper application therefor, woula be terminated; 
(3) For the purpose of applying section 224 of the Social Security Act to the disability insurance benefit used to 
compute the reduction under this subsection, the amount of the CSRS annuity considered shall be the amount of the 
CSRS annuity before application of this section 
(4) The Office shall prescribe regulations to carry out this subsection 
(c) For the purpose of this section, the term Tederal service" means service which is employment for the purposes 
of title II of the Social Security Act and chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by reason of the 
amendments made by section 101 of the Social Security Amendments of 1983 
(d) In administering subsections (a) through (c)~ 
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(1) the terms "an individual under section 8402(b)(2)" and "an individual described in section 8402(b)(2)" shall 
each be considered to include any individual— 
(A) who is subject to this subchapter as a result of any provision of law described in section 8347(o), and 
(B) whose employment (as described in section 8347(o)) is also employment for purposes of title II of the 
Social Security Act and chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and 
(2) the term "Federal service", as applied with respect to any individual to whom this section applies as a result 
of paragraph (1), means any employment referred to in paragraph (1)(B) performed after December 31, 1983. 
CREDIT(S) 
(Added Pub.L. 99-335, Title II, § 201(b)(1), June 6, 1986, 100 Stat. 589, and amended Pub.L. 99-514, § 2, Oct. 
22, 1986, 100 Stat. 2095; Pub.L. 100-238, Title I, § 108(b)(2), Jan. 8, 1988, 101 Stat. 1748.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 
1986 Acts. House Conference Report No. 99-841 and Statement by President, see 1986 U.S. Code Cong, and 
Adm. News, p. 4075. 
Senate Report No. 99-166, House Conference Report No. 99-606, and Statement by President, see 1986 U.S. Code 
Cong, and Adm. News, p. 1405. 
1988 Acts. House Report No. 100-374 and Statement by President, see 1987 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm. News, p. 
3217. 
References in Text 
The Social Security Act, referred to in subsecs. (a)(1), (2)(B), (b)(1), (2)(B), (c), and (d) is Act Aug. 14, 1935, c. 
531, 49 Stat. 620, as amended. Title II of the Social Security Act is classified generally to subchapter II (section 
401 et seq.) of chapter 7 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare. For complete classification of this Act to the 
Code, see section 1305 of Title 42 and Tables. 
Section 214(a) of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(3)(A)(i)(II), is classified to section 414(a) of 
Title 42. 
Section 203 of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (a)(3)(A)(ii) and (B)(i)(I), is classified to section 403 
of Title 42. 
Section 215(a)(7)(B)(i) and (d)(5)(ii), referred to in subsec. (a)(5), is classified to section 415 of Title 42. 
Section 224 of the Social Security Act, referred to in subsec. (b)(3), is classified to section 424a of Title 42. 
Chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, referred to in subsecs. (c) and (d)(1)(B), is classified to chapter 
21 (section 3101 et seq.) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code. 
Section 101 of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, referred to in subsec. (c), is section 101 of Pub.L. 98-21, 
which amended section 3121 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code, and sections 409 and 410 of Title 42, The Public 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page 4 
5 U.S.C.A. § 8349 
Health and Welfare, and enacted provisions set out as notes under sections 3121 of Title 26 and 410 of Title 42. 
Amendments 
1988 Amendments. Subsec. (d). Pub.L. 100-238, § 108(b)(2), added subsec. (d). 
1986 Amendments. Subsec. (c). Pub.L.99-514 substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1986" for "Internal Revenue 
Code of 1954". 
Effective and Applicability Provisions 
1988 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 100-238 effective Jan. 1, 1987, see section 108(b)(3) of Pub.L. 100-238, set out 
as a note under section 8334 of this title. 
1986 Acts. Section effective Jan. 1, 1987, see section 702(a) of Pub.L. 99- 335, set out as a note under section 
8401 of this title. 
Offsets To Prevent Full Double Coverage for Employees of Park Police and Secret Service 
Provisions relating to offsets for the prevention of full double coverage for employees of the Park Police and the 
Secret Service, see section 103(e) of Pub.L. 100-238, set out as a note under section 8334 of this title. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System annuity reduced consistent with this section, 
see50USCA§2031. 
Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System annuity computed as if this section applied, see 22 USCA 
§ 4046. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Officers and Public Employees kl01.5. 
United States €=^39(15). 
Key Number System Topic Nos. 283, 393. 
RESEARCH REFERENCES 
Encyclopedias 
Am. Jur. 2d Pensions and Retirement Funds § 1098, Offset Relating to Social Security Benefits. 
5 U.S.C.A. § 8349, 5 USCA § 8349 
Current through P.L. 109-482 (End) approved 01-15-07 
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ADDENDUM B 
PV as of date 
Payments 
Commence 
Mark Olsen (No survivor benefit) 1-Mar-05 1-Apr-G5 
Mark Olsen (Survivor benefits) 1-Mar-05 1-Apr-05 
Mark Oisen (Share of survivor benefits) 1 -Mar-05 1-Apr-05 
Carolyn Olsen (No survivor benefit) 1-Mar«G5 l-JuI-05 
Carolyn Olsen (50% survivor benefit) 1-lWar-05 1-Jul-05 
^ Carolyn Olsen (Share of 50% survivor benefit) 1 -Mar-05 1 -Jui-05 
Carolyn Olsen (No survivor benefil) 1 -Mar-05 1-Jul-09 
Carolyn Olsen (50% survivor benefit) 1-Mar-05 1-Jurt-09 
Carolyn Olsen (Share of 50% survivor benefit) 1-Mar-05 1-Jul-09 
Carolyn Olsen Social Security 1-Mar-05 1-May-19 
Payment interest Term PV 
5,214.19 4.60% 282 Months 897,804.70 
4,715.00 4.60% 282 Months 8S7.150.50 
2.867.00 4.60% 150 Months 
4.715.00 4.60% 282 Months 776.121.64 
2.491.00 4.60% 358 Months 479,121.77 
2,409.00 4.60% 358 Months 482,810.33 
1.204.00 4.60% 74 Months 
2,409.00 4.60% 358 Months 463.349.80 
2.825.00 4.60% 316 Months 425.337.07 
2.715.00 4.60% 316 Months 430.211.01 
1,357.00 4.60% 74 Months 
2.715.00 4.60% 316 Months 408,775.27 
1.647.00 4.60% 218 Months 127,323.06 
Mark Olsen (No survivor benefit) 
Carolyn OJsen (No survivor benefit) 
Carolyn Olsen Social Security 
Carolyn Olsen Social Security 
Payments 
PV as of date Commence Payment 
1-Mar-05 t-Apr-05 5,214.19 
1-Mar-05 1-Jul-05 2,491.00 
1-Mar-05 1-May-19 1,647.00 
1-Mar-05 1-May-19 1,647.00 
Interest Term PV 
4.60% 282 Months 897,804.70 
4.60% 358 Months 479,121.77 
4.60% 218 Months 127,323.06 
4.60% 188 Months 115,435.24 
ADDENDUM C 
ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373 
Attorney for Petitioner 






IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STA TE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDENDEPARTMENT 
oOo 
CAROLYN A. OLSEN, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA W 
Petitioner, 
vs. : 
Civil No. 034902377 
MARK K. OLSEN, 
Judge Scott M. Hadley 
Mark Olsen. : 
Commissioner Douglas B. Thomas 
Non-jury trial in the above entitled matter came on regularly for hearing before the 
Honorable Scott M. Hadley, District Court Judge, on March 14, March 18, and April 4, 2005. 
Petitioner, Carolyn A. Olsen and Respondent, Mark K. Olsen, were sworn and testified together 
with witnesses Jason Stewart, Andy Bailey, Ken Thomson, Jean Hill, Cheryl Messerly, Brent 
Griffiths, William Poulter, Kerry Olsen, Helen Brown, and Kevin Baumgard. The Court having 
received exhibits from each of the parties; having reviewed the pleadings and affidavits on file; 
and having heard the arguments and representations of counsel and being fully advised in the 
matter, hereby makes the following: 
Carolyn A. Olsen v. Mark K. Olsen 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 034902377 
Page 2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Carolyn Olsen and Mark Olsen are both actual and bona fide residents of Weber 
County, State of Utah, and have been for more than tliree (3) months immediately prior to the 
filing of this action for divorce. 
2. Carolyn Olsen and Mark Olsen were married on May 5, 1978, in Eden, Weber 
County, Utah, and have remained as wife and husband since that time. 
3. Two (2) children have been born as issue of the parties' marriage, to-wit: Michael 
Olsen, who is 21 years of age and emancipated, and Jesse Mark Olsen, born November 27, 1986. 
Jesse is 18 years of age and will graduate from high school on June 3, 2005. 
4. Carolyn Olsen is 52 years of age and was born on April 2, 1953. 
5. Mark Olsen is 55 years of age and was born on October 30, 1949. 
6. The parties separated on November 16, 2003, and have experienced irreconcilable 
differences making the continuation of this marriage impossible. 
7. Carolyn Olsen should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from Mark Olsen, the same to 
become final upon entry. 
8. The Court's previous Order of February 5, 2004, regarding custody of Jesse Olsen, 
child support, and alimony shall continue in place through June 30, 2005, wherein Carolyn Olsen 
is awarded base child support of $527.00 per month and alimony of $465.00 per month. 
9. Both parties have available, through their respective places of employment, medical 
Carolyn A. Olsen v. Mark K. Olsen 
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24. Carolyn Olsen filed for divorce on December 11, 2003, and has occupied the marital 
residence since separation. 
25. Mark Olsen, after the separation, resided in the basement of a friend and later rented 
a condominium. 
26. The Court finds Mark Olsen does not reside with his friend, Cheryl Messerly, nor do 
the parties share living expenses. 
27. The Court finds the parties' 21 year old son, Michael, attends Utah State University 
and comes home on holidays, some weekends, and when school is not in session. 
28. The Court finds the parties5 18 year old son, Jesse Olsen, also intends to attend Utah 
State University commencing fall semester of 2005 and will reside in Logan, Utah, during the 
school year. 
29. The Court finds the line of credit balance at the time the parties separated was 
$57,300.00 and the balance at the time of trial was $45,923.00, representing an $11,442.00 
reduction in principal. 
30. The Court finds the parties' two children reside in the marital home in the summer 
and also work in the area and reside with their mother when not in school. Carolyn Olsen would 
like to be awarded the home as it is near her work and to provide a home for the children when 
they are not attending college. 
31. The Court finds the fair market value of the marital residence is $329,000.00 
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pursuant to an appraisal. 
32. Mark Olsen would like to be awarded the home as he is capable of maintaining the 
home having, for the most part, constructed the home. 
33. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen has appropriately maintained the property since the 
parties separation and has educated herself as to taking care of the property. 
34. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen was allowed the use and benefit of her mother's two 
(2) cabins located in Ogden Canyon during the parties' marriage. The parties were able to rent 
the cabins and were entitled to receive the rental proceeds even though the deed to the cabins 
remained in Carolyn Olsen's mother's name until 1998, when Helen Adams Brown conveyed, by 
Quit Claim Deed, the two cabins to Carolyn Olsen. 
35. The Court finds these cabins are presently rented occupied by two tenants and require 
the typical landlord duties. 
36. The Court finds the two cabins were owned by Carolyn Olsen's mother and father, 
who occupied the same until approximately the mid 1950's when they moved and converted the 
same to rental property. 
37. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's father passed away in the 1960!s and Carolyn 
Olsen's mother owned the properties solely in her name thereafter. 
38. The Court finds that in the 1970's the cabins became in disrepair. 
39. The Court finds that Mark Olsen, with the consent of Carolyn Olsen's mother, was 
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67. The Court finds that Mark Olsen's appraiser expressed an opinion there should be a 
25 to 50% discount in the value of the property because the Olsens owned a fractionalized 
interest in the property. 
68. The Court finds the parties have essentially five (5) retirement plans. The Court finds 
Carolyn Olsen has three (3) retirement plans: Social Security, a pension plan with the Utah State 
Retirement System, and a 401(k) retirement plan with the Utah State Retirement System. Mark 
Olsen has two retirement plans, a Thrift Savings Plan, a defined contribution plan together with a 
pension plan designated as CSRS, Civilian Service Retirement System Plan. 
69. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen intends to work at least five to ten more years as 
a school teacher before retiring. 
70. The Court finds that during the marriage Carolyn Olsen contributed to social security 
and Mark Olsen did not. 
71. The Court finds thai Carolyn Olsen has contributed, during the course of the 
marriage, $53,196.00 to Social Security. 
72. The Court finds that Brent Griffiths, CPA opined that if Carolyn Olsen lived to her 
anticipated life expectancy, met all the requirements of social security, and assuming Carolyn 
survived an additional 13 years until she was 65, the present value of her social security is 
calculated to be $115,435.24. The Court finds that federal law prohibits any type of QDRO to 
divide the monthly social security benefits of Carolyn Olsen. 
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73. The Court finds that as to Carolyn Olsen's pension plan, a defined benefit plan, the 
most equitable and least speculative way to divide the same between the parties is per the 
Woodward formula wherein each party is awarded one-half (Vi) of the retirement benefits 
acquired during the course of the marriage. 
74. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen's 401(k) plan had a balance of $119,519.53 on 
December 31, 2003, when Mark Olsen stopped contributing to his defined contribution plan 
designated as a Thrift Savings Plan. 
75. The Court finds that Mark Olsen's Thrift Savings Plan a defined contribution plan 
had a balance of $93,639.00 on December 31, 2003. 
76. The Court finds Mark Olsen has a defined benefit retirement plan designated as 
CSRS (Civilian Service Retirement System) Plan and the most equitable way to divide the same 
between the parties involving the least amount of speculation is to divide the retirement benefits 
pursuant to the Woodward formula with Carolyn Olsen awarded one-half (54) of the retirement 
benefits from May 5, 1978, date of marriage, until the parties' date of divorce. 
77. The Court finds Mark Olsen's accumulated annual leave was a pre-marital asset as he 
had accumulated 240 hours prior to the parties' marriage in May of 1978. 
78. The Court finds there has been no augmentation or co-mingling of the annual leave 
hours and therefore finds the value of Mark Olsen's annual sick leave is not a marital asset. 
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101. The Court finds each party has incurred various debts and obligations since their 
separation in November of 2003, and that each party should pay their own individual debts and 
obligations incurred after the date of separation, holding the other party harmless therefrom. 
102. The Court did not consider either party's retirement as a foreseeable event in 
determining Carolyn Olsen's alimony award. 
103. The Court continues the existing temporary award of alimony to Carolyn Olsen 
through June of 2005, and the Court finds the permanent award of alimony should commence 
July 1,2005. 
104. The Court finds it should analyze the issue of whether Carolyn Olsen should be 
awarded alimony based upon the traditional Jones v. Jones factors considering the needs of the 
wife, her ability to contribute to her monthly needs, and finally, the husband's ability to pay. 
105. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen has listed her monthly living expenses as set 
forth in her Exhibit 1 at $45020.00. Mark Olsen objects to some of Carolyn Olscn's monthly 
living expenses and the Court will address those individually. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's 
monthly living expenses other than those disputed by Mark Olsen are reasonable and the Court 
approves those expenses. 
106. The Court finds that as to Carolyn Olsen's monthly living expenses disputed by 
Mark Olsen, the first disputed issue to be monthly medical and health insurance expense paid by 
Carolyn Olsen in the sum of $556.59 per month, which is a payroll deduction through her place 
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of employment with the Weber County School District. 
107. Mark Olsen disputes that Carolyn Olsen should be permitted to insure the parties' 
two adult children on her medical plan. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen has always maintained the 
family medical insurance and insuring their children has become a part of the standard of living 
of the parties. 
108. The Court finds that both parties have available through their place of employment, 
medical and health insurance for their children and that they have always maintained medical 
insurance for their adult children, specifically Michael Olsen. 
109. The Court finds that based upon the history of the parties and their past standard of 
living, the Court approves $556.59 per month health insurance expense as a need of Carolyn 
Olsen. 
110. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen has deducted from her monthly gross income 
$600.00 toward contribution to her 401k plan and $300.00 savings to her credit union and finds 
that Carolyn Olsen has contributed, for many years, a total of $900.00 per month toward either 
her retirement or savings. The Court finds the monthly contribution of Carolyn Olsen to her 401k 
plan in the sum of $600.00 and savings to the credit union of $300.00 has become a standard of 
living of the parties for many years and approves the same consistent with the Bakanowski case 
cited by both parties. However, the Court will only allow one-half (V2), $450.00 as a necessary 
monthly expense as Mark Olsen had an expectation to receive one-half (l/2) of Carolyn's 
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become a part of the parties' standard of living. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen should be 
allowed to claim $100.00 per month as part of her standard of living and will also allow Mark 
Olsen to claim $100.00 per month as part of his standard of living. 
118. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen5s total monthly living expenses necessary to 
maintain the standard of living she has grown accustomed to during the parties' marriage is 
$3,920.00; a deduction of $100.00 from her monthly expenses set forth in her Exhibit 1. 
119. The Court finds that in regard to Carolyn Olsen's ability to contribute toward her 
financial expenses each month, the Court considers Carolyn Olsen has a Bachelor's Degree, 
together with a Master's Degree from Utah State University in Education and teaches 5th grade at 
Valley Elementary in Huntsville, Utah. Her contract for the school year 2004-2005 pays 
$48,491.00 gross per annum, plus career ladder pay. 
120. The Court finds that Carolyn Olsen has a monthly gross income of $4,865.00 which 
includes $625.00 per month rental income from the cabins and career ladder income. 
121. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's net monthly income to be $3,058.00. 
122. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen is employed full time as a school teacher. School 
teachers typically engage in continuing education during the summer and preparing for the school 
year. In addition, Carolyn Olsen has to maintain the cabins which can be best accomplished 
during the summer months. 
123. The Court finds Carolyn Olsen's unmet monthly financial shortfall is $862.00, 
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living expenses of $3,920.00 less $3,058.00 net income. 
124. The Court finds Mark Olsen's annual gross income is $104,987.00, which is 
equivalent of $8,749.00 per month gross income. 
125. The Court finds Mark Olsen's monthly net income to be $5,390.00 allowing for 
deductions he set out in his Exhibit 6. 
126. The Court finds that Mark Olsen should be allowed to contribute an additional 
$125.00 per month to his savings to equalize the expense allowed to Carolyn Olsen. Thus, Mark 
Olsen has a monthly net income, for marital purposes, of $5,265.00. 
127. The Court finds that as to Mark Olsen's monthly financial needs, his reasonable 
housing allowance is $1,403.00 which includes mortgage payment, taxes, insurance, and 
maintenance. 
128. The Court finds Mark Olsen's monthly utility expense should be the same as 
Carolyn Okeii's of $486.00 per month. 
129. The Court finds Mark Olsen's food and household supplies to be $500.00 per 
month, the same as Carolyn Olsen. 
130. The Court finds Mark Olsen's personal monthly living expenses to be $644.00 to 
include clothing, medical, dental, recreation, grooming, travel and vacations, and laundry. 
131. The Court finds Mark Olsen's monthly transportation expense to be $600.00 per 
month which includes gas, oil, maintenance of automobile, license and insurance and $300.00 as 
